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BRIEFER COMMUNICATION.
EXECUTIVE POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL AM~NDM~N1.’.
The right of an executive to veto a proposed constitutional amend-
ment has been raised in a case now pending in the Pennsylvania
courts. At the 1899 session of the Pennsylvania Legislature, an
amendment to the constitution of the state was proposed by the writer
opening the way for the introduction of a system of personal registra-
tion. The constitutional provision relating to this subject as it stands
at present reads as follows :&horbar;’’ No elector shall be deprived of the
privilege of voting by reason of his name not being registered. &dquo; This
effectually prevents the introduction of any adequate system of per-
sonal registration, such as now prevails in New York, Massachusetts
and certain other states. The proposed amendment was passed by
the necessary majorities by both houses of the Pennsylvania Legisla-
ture and mistakenly sent to the governor for his approval. He
vetoed the proposal after the legislature adjourned ; so there was no
opportunity to pass it over his veto.
The action of the governor was at once questioned by the Municipal
League of Philadelphia, which took the necessary steps to test his
right in the premises. The provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution
relating to amendments reads thus :-(Article 18, section 1.)-&dquo; Any
amendment or amendments to this constitution may be proposed in the
senate or house of representatives and if the same shall be agreed to by
a majority of the members of each house, such proposed amendment or
amendments shall be entered on their journals with the yeas and
nays taken thereon and the secretary of the commonwealth shall
cause the same to be published three months before the general
election in at least two newspapers in every county in which such
newspapers shall be published, etc.&dquo; The governor sustained his
right to veto under section 26 of article 3, which provides that ‘ every
order, resolution or vote to which the concurrence of both houses
may be necessary, except on the question of adjournment, shall be
presented to the governor and before it shall take effect, be approved
by him, or being disapproved shall be repassed by two-thirds of both
houses, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case
of a bill.&dquo;
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The secretary of the commonwealth refused to comply with the
constitutional provision, maintaining that the governor’s veto was
valid; whereupon George Burnham, Jr., president of the Philadelphia
Municipal League, petitioned the attorney -general to issue a writ of
mandamus directed to the secretary of the commonwealth to show
cause why he should not advertise the amendments as provided by
the constitution, which petition after argument was granted.
At the hearing before the Dauphin County Court, counsel for the
Municipal League set forth that Article i, Section 7, of the Federal
Constitution was identical with Article 3, Section 26, of the Constitu-
tion of Pennsylvania, and that Article 5 of the Constitution of the
United States, relating to amendments, reads as follows: &dquo; Congress
whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary shall
propose amendments to this constitution which shall be valid to all
intents and purposes as part of this constitution, when ratified by the
Legislatures of three-fourths of the several states or by conventions
of three-fourths thereof as one or the other mode of ratification shall
be proposed by Congress.&dquo; It was contended that if there was any
conflict existing between Section 26, Article 3, and Article 18 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution, the same conflict existed between Article
I, Section 7, and Article 5 of the Federal Constitution. Inasmuch as
the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Hollingsworth
et al. vs. Virginia, 3 Dallas, 378, decided in substance that there was
no conflict between the two last mentioned provisions, that the
act of amendment is a substantive act, unconnected with the ordinary
business of legislation and was not within the policy or terms of
investing the President with a qualified negative of the acts and reso-
lutions of Congress; that the President had no power of approval or
disapproval of any proposed constitutional amendment; that he has
nothing to do with the proposal or adoption of amendments to the
constitution.
Jameson in his work on Constitutional Conventions points out that
the amendments to the constitution proposed by Congress in 1789,
1794, 1803 and 1867, were not submitted or presented to the President
for his approval, and that the same is substantially true of the amend-
ments relative to slavery proposed by the same body in 1861. In the
latter year, however, the amendments proposed by Congress having
by inadvertence been presented to the President of the United States
for his approval by a subordinate of the Senate, Senator Trumbull of
Illinois, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of that body, intro-
duced the following resolution, which was adopted without division,
but after exhaustive argument, in which among others Senator Reverdy
Johnson participated: &dquo; Resolved that the article of amendment
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proposed by Congress to be added to the Constitution of the United
States respecting extinction of slavery therein, having been inadver-
tently presented to the President for his approval, it is hereby declared
that such approval was unnecessary to give effect to the action of Con-
gress in proposing such amendments, inconsistent with the former
practice in reference to amendments to the constitution heretofore
adopted and being inadvertently done should not constitute a prece-
dent for the future, and the secretary is hereby instructed not to com-
municate the notice of the approval of such amendment by the
President to the House of Representatives.&dquo;
This unanimous practice under the Federal Constitution has been
followed in most if not all of the states, and wherever the question
has been brought before the state courts for determination under a
similar state of facts, has been determined in accordance with the
Federal practice. The latest case dealing with similar provisions was
that of the lottery amendments passed upon by the Supreme Court of
Louisiana in 1891. The Constitution of Louisiana provides in words
almost identical with the provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution
and of the Federal Constitution &dquo; that every order, resolution or vote
to which the concurrence of both houses may be necessary, except on
a question of adjournment, shall be presented to the governor, and
before it shall take effect be approved by him, and being disapproved
shall be repassed by two-thirds of the niembers elected to each house.&dquo;
The provision relating to the proposal of amendments is also sub-
stantially the same as the similar provision of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution. In construing these provisions the Supreme Court of
Louisiana in an elaborately prepared series of opinions, after the most
careful and exhaustive argument by eminent counsel on both sides,
held, that although the Governor of Louisiana had vetoed the pro-
posals in question, the veto had no effect. The court held that the
signature of the governor to the proposal for the amendment to the
constitution under discussion was not required by the constitution and
that his approval of it did not affect its validiiy. State ex rel. Mason,
43 La. Annual.
This decision followed the decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court
in, in re.Senate File 31, 25 Neb. 887.
It was pointed out on behalf of the League that the last amendment
that had been submitted to the people of Pennsylvania, namely, that
of 1889 relating to the abolition of the poll-tax, had been submitted
without executive approval. The League’s counsel argued the case
on the theory that not only had the uniform practice in the various
states where similar provisions existed been against the governor’s
contention and in favor of that of the League, but that the proper
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theory of the governor’s veto is that when the people have no chance
to express their approval or disapproval of a proposition, then the
governor as their representative can intervene his veto, unless an over-
whelming proportion of both houses, namely, two-thirds of both
branches, should be of the opinion that the proposition should take
force and effect. The people themselves, however, have a chance, as
the constitution undoubtedly intends that they should have, when it
comes to amending their fundamental law. Then the governor’s
function as a representative of the people in this connection ceases
and he has no right to prevent them from approving or disapproving.
The final approval or disapproval of constitutional amendments rests
with the people. They have never delegated their power over this
vitally important matter to any single individual. To save themselves
from being annoyed by frivolous, ill-spirited or injudicious amend-
ments, they have agreed not to consider any which cannot command
a majority of the members of two legislatures; but this is the only
limitation. There is ne conflict between the two provisions of the
constitution in question, one relates to legislation, the other to consti-
tutional amendments. One regulates the action of the Legislature, the
other the direct legislation of the people. If, therefore, there is
no conflict between the two, that provision which relates to and affects
the sovereignty of the people themselves, and regulates their action in
the most important and solemn matter of government, must prevail
over any and all others, else we are brought face to face with the dan-
gers which it was intended to obviate. The change can only be ob-
tained by revolution.
Judge weirs, of the Dauphin County Court, refused the application
for a mandamus and maintained that the proposed amendment to the
constitution of the State must be presented to the governor for his
approval or disapproval, and that Section 26 of Article 3 and Article
18 should be read into each other. Silence according to his view is
not an equivalent and has not the force of an exception. The omission
in Article 18, requiring presentation of proposed amendments to the
governor for consideration and action is significant, but the omission
to except such amendments in Section 26, Article 3, from its opera-
tion is of still greater significance, and leads to the conclusion that
the provisions of Section 26 were to apply alike to proposed amend-
ments of the constitution and other orders, resolutions and votes.
&dquo; 1’he proceedings to adopt an amendment to the constitution are
legislative in their nature and character. The sovereignty of the
people is not called into requisition until the required legislative
proceedings are enacted and the governor is an essential factor in
all matters relating to legislation. Legislation and amending the
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constitution seem to us to be alike important and closely interwoven
and it is belittling that instrument to characterize legislative authority
by it as an ordinary and amending the constitution by some higher
designation.’’
The case has been appealed by the I,eagu.e to the Supreme Court,
although the time provided in Article 18 for advertising has passed.
CLINTON ROGERS WOODRUFF.
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